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Abstract 
The paper provides a micro-behavioral model and an experimental design to understand the effect 
of heterogeneity in social identities on cooperation while accounting for endogenous sorting. 
Social identity is induced exogenously using the minimal group paradigm. The experiment 
manipulates sorting with three treatments: having subjects interact with both in- and outgroup 
members, giving them the choice to interact either with ingroup or outgroup members, and 
isolating the groups from the outset. Cooperation is measured by the Prisoner’s Dilemma Games at 
the dyadic-level and by Public Goods Games at the tetradic-level. The results show that 
heterogeneity hampers between-group cooperation at the dyadic-level. In addition, endogenous 
sorting mitigates this negative effect of heterogeneity on cooperation. Heterogeneity hampers 
cooperation at the tetradic-level most substantially if there is a commonly known negative history 
between groups. 
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In the near future, the developed regions of the world will become much more heterogeneous 
ethnically and culturally, not only due to factors such as wars and conflicts that force emigration 
from developing countries but also due to the need in the developed world to attract more foreign 
labor (UK Office for National Statistics 2014). This increase in heterogeneity with respect to social 
identities may bring many challenges, including but not restricted to urban integration, interethnic 
conflict, and threats to social cohesion and social capital (Putnam 2001; Putnam 2007). 
Understanding the social consequences of heterogeneity is, thus, one of the most important 
questions in sociology. 
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In this paper, we focus on cooperative behavior in social dilemmas and investigate how 
heterogeneity in social identity affects cooperation. Social dilemmas pose a conflict between 
collective and individual interests (Dawes 1980; Kollock 1998). Problems of collective action 
(Olson 1965), trust (Dasgupta 1988; Gambetta 1988), and cooperation (Taylor 1987) are classical 
examples of social dilemmas. Studying cooperation in social dilemmas is important because the 
capacity of a society to peacefully solve the conflict between individual and collective interests for 
the benefit of the latter characterizes the level of social cohesion in the society (Coleman 1990; 
Roca and Helbing 2011). 
Prior experimental work has shown that heterogeneity in social identity generally hampers 
cooperation in social dilemmas (e.g., Yamagishi and Kiyonari 2000; Fershtman and Gneezy 2001; 
Bouckaert and Dhaene 2004; Eckel and Grossman 2005; Simpson 2006; Habyarimana et al. 2007; 
Chen and Li 2009). The results of these experiments resonate well with the observational studies 
which also show, albeit not in all occasions, a negative association between heterogeneity and 
social cohesion (see Dinesen and Sønderskoy 2015 and for an overview Van der Meer and Tolsma 
2014). 
In most prior experimental and observational studies, however, a crucial factor, namely 
endogenous sorting of heterogeneous actors has been largely left out. It is well documented that 
when a social entity is composed of heterogeneous actors, these actors tend to self-select into 
homogeneous subgroups (Schelling 1971; Marsden 1987; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 
2001). Due to this self-selection, the society may be globally heterogeneous but locally 
homogeneous, making heterogeneity a “moving target" (Uslaner 2010). Exposure to outgroups is 
thought to be a key mediator of the heterogeneity-cooperation link (Dinesen and Sønderskoy 
2015). To what extent exposure to outgroups increases with heterogeneity is very difficult to 
4 
assess due to endogenous sorting of actors. In the aforementioned experimental studies, the 
experimenter typically forces subjects of different social identities to interact and compares the 
level of cooperation under this condition with an alternative condition in which actors of the same 
social identity are forced to interact. This typical design leaves no room for sorting. In the 
observational studies of the heterogeneity-cohesion link, the researcher can only observe social 
cohesion in an environment ex-post, that is, only after actors have sorted into the environment.  
In this paper, we allow endogenous sorting in a controlled experiment by giving subjects the 
opportunity to choose the social group of their interaction partner before the interaction takes 
place. We compare this treatment with other treatments in which partner selection is not allowed, 
similar to the treatments in previous experimental studies. We show, as predicted by our theory, 
that allowing endogenous sorting mitigates the negative effects of heterogeneity on cooperation. 
We thus illustrate, both theoretically and empirically, that ignoring endogenous sorting processes 
yields misleading conclusions on the heterogeneity-cooperation link.  
A second important aspect of the current work is that we study the heterogeneity-cooperation 
link at two levels: local (dyadic) and aggregate (tetradic). Actors can sort into homogenous 
environments locally, but at the aggregate-level heterogeneity remains unchanged. For example, 
sorting into different neighborhoods in a city does not influence heterogeneity at the city-level. 
Yet, some collective goods are produced at the local-level and some at the aggregate-level. The 
level at which the heterogeneity-cooperation link is studied is important. Dinesen and Sønderskoy 
(2015), for example, show that it is heterogeneity at the immediate micro-context rather than 
heterogeneity at larger geographical units that hampers social cohesion. The level at which 
Dinesen and Sønderskoy (2015) measure social cohesion, however, still remains unclear. In this 
paper we aim to show that depending on how interactions at the local-level unfold, hererogeneity 
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may or may not substantially influence cooperation at the aggregate-level. In other words, we 
show that the heterogeneity-cooperation link at the aggregate-level is not independent from 
local-level interactions.  
A further distinctive feature of the current work is that we provide an explicit micro-behavioral 
model that defines and formalizes the micro mechanisms that link heterogeneity, self-selection 
into homogenous groups, and cooperation. Any theoretical model that seeks to explain a macro 
relationship should, in principle, include some sort of individual-level mechanism (Coleman 1990; 
Hedström 2005; Raub, Buskens, and van Assen 2011). This micro mechanism is missing in most 
previous theoretical work. For example, Putnam (2007) argues that heterogeneity hampers all 
forms of cooperation and trust (i.e., between and within groups). But the mechanisms through 
which heterogeneity hampers these different forms of cooperation remains unclear in Putnam’s 
original work (Van der Meer and Tolsma 2014). 
THEORY 
We present our theoretical model in two steps. In the first step, we start with the case in which 
actors do not have an option to choose their interaction partner. This resembles the situation in 
almost all intergroup experiments (e.g., Yamagishi and Kiyonari 2000; Eckel and Grossman 2005; 
Simpson 2006; Chen and Li 2009). In the second step, we allow actors to choose the group of their 
interaction partners before the interaction takes place. This allows actors to potentially sort into 
homogenous subgroups. Perhaps due to theoretical and practical difficulties of providing actors 
with an opportunity to choose their partners, past experimental research has mostly ignored 
endogenous sorting (for an exception, see Slonim and Garbarino 2008).1  
Social identity theory (Tajfel 1970; Tajfel et al. 1971) predicts that actors classify self and 
others in a few categories to cope with cognitive complexity. This is called the categorization 
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process. The second important element of social identity theory is self-enhancement: actors are 
predicted to attribute positive characteristics to the ingroup and negative characteristics to the 
outgroup. In addition to categorization and self-enhancement, a further element of social identity 
theory is about actors' perceptions of others’ interests: ingroup members’ interests are perceived as 
interchangeable, and actors assign a greater weight to collective ingroup outcomes than the 
outcomes for the self (Kramer and Brewer 1984; Turner 1985). We capture these effects of social 
identity on perceptions of others’ interests in the following way.  
In our model, in their “utility functions" actors assign non-zero weights to the outcomes of 
others. A utility function is a function that maps a distribution of tangible objective outcomes, such 
as money, to a subjective evaluation of this distribution. In principle, outcomes can be negative or 
positive. In our application, all outcomes are positive. An actor has two weights in their utility 
function, one for ingroup members’ outcomes and one for outgroup members’ outcomes. These 
weights are random variables and actors may have different weights. For example, some actors 
may assign higher weights to others’ outcomes. Others may assign zero weights and thus are 
selfish. Still others may assign negative weights to others' outcomes. This latter type of actors can 
be classified as competitors. Utilities can be negative while outcomes are positive. For example, a 
competitor actor who assigns a negative weight to others' outcomes may derive disutility from a 
distribution in which his/her own outcomes are lower than others' outcomes.  
Furthermore, we assume that actors vary with respect to ingroup bias; some assign high 
weights to ingroup members and low weights to outgroup members, others are less biased and 
assign similar weights to ingroup and outgroup members. Some “multicultural" actors may even 
assign higher weights to outgroup members’ outcomes than to ingroup members’ outcomes. Yet, 
in line with social identity theory we expect that, on average, the weight assigned to the outcomes 
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of ingroup members is higher than that of outgroup members' outcomes. Formally, the utility of 
actor i from an outcome allocation for the self (x) and for N
j
 others (y) is: 
𝑈(𝑥, 𝒚) = 𝑥 + ∑ 𝜃𝑖
𝑔 × 𝑦𝑗  with 𝜃𝑖
𝑔 = {
𝜃𝑖
𝐼if 𝑗 ∈ 𝐼
𝜃𝑖
𝑂if 𝑗 ∈ 𝑂
 and 𝐸(𝜃𝑖
𝐼) > 𝐸(𝜃𝑖
𝑂) (1) 
where I indicates the set of ingroup members and O indicates the set of outgroup members, and 𝜃𝑖
𝐼 
is the weight i assigns to the outcomes of ingroup others and 𝜃𝑖
𝑂 to the outcomes of outgroup 
others. The utility is thus simply the outcome for the self (x) plus the sum of the outcomes of others 
weighted by 𝜃𝑖
𝐺 . This is an extension of the social orientation model (Schulz and May 1989; 
Van Lange 2000; Simpson 2004; Chen and Li 2009; Aksoy and Weesie 2012; Murphy, 
Ackermann, and Handgraaf 2011; Aksoy and Weesie 2014). Given this utility function, actors 
transform the outcomes in the PD and PG (Table 1) into utilities. Previous research has shown that 
this model is successful in explaining cooperative behavior in social dilemmas (Aksoy and Weesie 
2009; Aksoy and Weesie 2013).  
The predictions summarized below are derived from the following two basic assumptions: (1) 
the average weight for ingroup members' outcomes is higher than the average weight for outgroup 
members' outcomes and (2) actors maximize utility given the function in equation 1 (the rationality 
assumption).  
Predictions for the PD with and without Partner Choice  
Consider the PD in Table 1 A. Without assuming any social preferences, the predicted behavior 
(which happens to be the Nash equilibrium) is mutual non-cooperation. This is because whatever 
the other player does, not cooperating gives a higher individual payoff. In game-theoretic 
language, not cooperating is a dominant strategy. Both actors would be better off by mutual 
cooperation which is unsustainable due to individual incentives for non-cooperation.  
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[Table-1-about-here] 
The solution of the game is different once one assumes social preferences. If we assume that 
subjects transform the outcomes in the PD into utilities using equation (1), then those with 
sufficiently large 𝜃𝑔  will cooperate. For example, if 𝜃𝑔 = .5 then, Player 1 prefers to cooperate 
if he/she thinks Player 2 will cooperate (because 30 + .5 × 30 > 35 + .5 × 15) and even if he/she 
thinks Player 2 will not cooperate (because 15 + .5 × 35 > 20 + .5 × 20). In fact, the critical value of 
𝜃𝑔  above which cooperation becomes more desirable is 1/3. Because we assume that on average 
ingroup 𝜃 is higher than outgroup 𝜃, there will be more actors with a 𝜃 exceeding 1/3 when two 
ingroup members play this game than when two outgroup members play.2 Hence, we expect that 
without partner choice, within-group cooperation will be higher than between-group cooperation 
(H1). 
Let's now assume that there are two groups, A and B, and before playing the game members of 
A and B can choose to be matched with either an ingroup or an outgroup member. In this case the 
formal analysis is more complex. The reason is as follows. An actor may choose to interact in an 
ingroup environment (i.e., play the PD with an ingroup member) or in an intergroup environment 
(i.e., play the PD with an outgroup member). The composition of these environments with respect 
to θ is endogenous. For example, members of Group A who choose to interact with members of 
Group B have a different θ distribution than members of Group A who choose to interact within 
their group. One may think that those who have only very large 𝜃𝑂s will choose to interact in 
intergroup environments. If that was the case, then the cooperation rates in intergroup 
environments would be very high, which would be exploited by others who do not have high 𝜃𝑂 
but choose to play in the intergroup environment to not cooperate and earn a high payoff. Of 
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course, each actors’ partner choice decision contributes to the composition of θ across 
environments.  
While an analytical solution is complex, a numerical solution can easily be found with 
computer simulations. Table 2 includes some examples. The table presents a number of θ 
distributions and the resulting predicted equilibrium cooperation rates with and without partner 
choice.3  
Extensive simulations show that when they have the choice, the majority of actors choose to 
interact with ingroup members (H2a) (see column 6 in Table 2). Furthermore, even with partner 
choice, the level of between-group cooperation is lower than the level of within-group cooperation 
(H2b)  (column 4 versus column 5 in Table 2). But the difference between within- and 
between-group cooperation will be lower when actors have partner choice than when they don't 
have partner choice (H2c) (see the difference in differences between columns 4 and 5 and columns 
8 and 9 in Table 2).  
[Table-2-about-here] 
These theoretical results point to a paradoxical effect of sorting. On the one hand, when actors 
are free to choose their interaction partners, they mostly interact with ingroup members which 
increases segregation. On the other hand, this sorting keeps the level of cooperation in 
between-group interactions higher compared to the situation in which actors are forced to interact 
with outgroup members. This latter phenomenon occurs because actors who would behave 
non-cooperatively toward outgroup others, had they been forced to interact with the outgroup, are 
more likely to play with ingroup members when they can choose. Thus, most of the actors who 
would behave non-cooperatively toward outgroup members endogenously sort into within-group 
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environments. This sorting keeps the level of cooperation in between-group environments 
relatively high. 
In addition to linking heterogeneity, sorting, and cooperation, our theoretical scheme provides 
further interesting implications. For example, research has shown that minority groups display 
more ingroup bias, are less cooperative, and have lower levels of generalized trust than majority 
groups (Hewstone, Rubin, and Willis 2002; Schlueter and Scheepers 2010; De Vroome, Hoege, 
and Marien 2013). In addition, a larger minority size is associated with stronger anti-immigrant 
attitudes among the majority group. These findings are often explained by psychological 
mechanisms such as perceived threat (Hewstone et al. 2002; Schlueter and Scheepers 2010).  
Our theoretical model provides an alternative, a more structural explanation. Minority groups 
are more constrained in their partner selection choices. That is, they have to interact with outgroup 
members more frequently than the majorities interact with minority groups. Majority group 
members, however, mostly lack the opportunity to interact with outgroup members. Translating 
this to our setup, the minorities interact more often in conditions that resemble the 9th column of 
Table 2 whereas the majorities interact more often in conditions that resemble the 8th or the 4th 
column of Table 2 because the majorities are often isolated or can choose to isolate from the 
minorities. Our theory predicts that cooperation will be lower among the minorities than the 
majorities because of these differences in the structure of interaction opportunities, not necessarily 
because of a perceived threat or any other psychological process.  
Predictions for PG  
Public Goods Game is the N-person version of the PD (Table 1B). Here, we will restrict the formal 
and empirical analysis of PG to the case in which actors cannot choose their interaction partners. 
Actors can sort into homogenous groups locally (in our case in the PD), but at the most aggregate 
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level (in our case PG) heterogeneity remains unchanged. For example, sorting into different 
neighborhoods does not influence heterogeneity at the city level. Yet, some collective goods are 
produced at the local-level and some still at the aggregate-level. Including PG alongside the PD, 
we aim to understand the interplay between the local- and aggregate-level dynamics.   
Consider the PG in Table 1B. As in the PD case, without social preferences universal 
non-cooperation is the predicted outcome of PG because not cooperating always gives a higher 
payoff irrespective of how many others cooperate. When we assume that actors transform the 
outcomes of the game into utilities using the equation (1) we have a different prediction: those with 
sufficiently high 𝜃𝐼 and 𝜃𝑂  will cooperate and the rest will not cooperate.4 The exact probability 
that an actor cooperates in PG depends on the actor's ingroup and outgroup θs, weighted by the 
number of ingroup and outgorup members involved in PG.  
One can test several implications of this formal result. For example, the higher the number of 
ingroup members relative to the number of outgroup members in the game, the higher the 
likelihood of cooperation. To be clear, we are not testing this prediction which is effectively the 
same as H1 formulated above. We will be testing H1 using the PD. In our experimental design, we 
keep the level of heterogeneity in PG constant: in all experimental conditions our subjects play 
PGs with one ingroup and two outgroup members. This is because we are interested in a further 
factor that may influence behavior in PG, namely prior negative between-group contact, which is 
discussed next. 
Negative between-group contact and cooperation. Contact between members of different 
groups is a double-edged sword. Under certain conditions, contact is predicted to reduce 
intergroup conflict (Allport 1954). Although this has been shown to be true in various situations 
(e.g., Brown and Hewstone 2005) in our case, the conditions for contact to be beneficial are not 
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present. Social dilemmas are situations in which there is a risk for cooperative actors to be 
exploited by non-cooperative others. The formal analysis presented above predicts that 
interactions between actors of different social identities in social dilemmas do not reduce conflict; 
on the contrary, in such situations cooperation is predicted to be low (also see Rutherford et al. 
2014).  
Recent social psychological studies on “negative contact" show that negative experiences 
between groups are more strongly related to increased conflict than positive experiences are with 
reducing conflict (Paolini, Harwood, and Rubin 2010; Barlow et al. 2012). This is consistent with 
the game-theoretic literature on reciprocity which shows that people adjust their social preferences 
based on the previous behaviors of their interaction partners. People respond to the negative 
intentions of others with less pro-social preferences (negative reciprocity), and the positive 
intentions of others with more pro-social preferences (positive reciprocity) (Gautschi 2000; Falk 
and Fischbacher 2006). Moreover, negative reciprocity is shown to be a stronger motivation than 
positive reciprocity (Aksoy and Weesie 2014).  
The formal analysis of the PD predicts that the subjects will experience the lowest levels of 
cooperation in between-group interactions when actors cannot choose the group of their 
interaction partners. When actors have partner choice, cooperation will still be lower in 
between-group interactions than in within-group interactions, but this difference will not be as 
high as the difference in the no partner choice case. Hence, we expect that during and after 
intergroup interactions unfold, subjects will lower their 𝜃𝑂  (the weight assigned to outgroup 
others' outcomes), particularly when they could not choose the group of their interaction partners. 
This yields the prediction that keeping the level of heterogeneity constant, the more prior negative 
between-group contact there is, the lower will be cooperation in heterogeneous PGs (H3). 
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Note that negative contact can have an effect on cooperation if actors receive information 
about others' decisions. When no feedback about others' decisions is provided, actors will not be 
exposed to non-cooperative behaviors of others (ingroup or outgroup), hence there will be no 
reason for reciprocity. We thus test H3 rigorously by experimentally concealing and revealing the 
information subjects receive about the level of negative contact between groups. 
METHODS 
Participants 
186 subjects were recruited using the online recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner 2004). To assess 
the external validity of the experiment, subjects from heterogeneous backgrounds were invited. Of 
the subjects, 42 percent were male, and 50 percent had UK citizenship. The remaining non-UK 
subjects were from 33 different countries. 75 percent of the subjects were students, mainly at the 
University of Oxford, and the remaining 25 percent were non-student citizens of the city of 
Oxford. The average age of the subjects was 29.8 years (S.D.=13.9). 
Design and Procedure 
The experiment comprised 10 sessions. In each session, subjects were seated randomly in a cubicle 
in the Nuffield Centre for Experimental Social Science (CESS) lab at Nuffield College, so that 
they could not see each other. The entire procedure took place on computers with the software 
z-tree (Fischbacher 2007). 5  Throughout the experiment, subjects earned tokens that were 
converted to cash at the end of the experiment at an exchange rate of 20 tokens = £1 (~1.6 USD). 
Subjects earned £14 (~22 USD) on average (min £11, max £17), including a £4 show-up fee. 
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The experiment included four between-subjects treatments, mixed, choice, isolated, and 
control, and two within-subjects treatments, no-feedback and feedback. The overall design of the 
experiment is shown in Table 3 and explained in detail below.6 
 
[Table-3-about-here] 
 
Inducing heterogeneity. Our theoretical model does not rely on the nature of the groups per se. 
The theory applies more generally to any case in which actors, on average, feel more altruistic 
toward an ingroup than toward an outgroup. Nonetheless, a key design issue is how to manipulate 
heterogeneity. One can use natural identities, such as ethnicity and gender or it can be induced in 
the lab. Both approaches have been implemented in the literature. Gil-White (2003), Bouckaert 
and Dhaene (2004), Buchan, Johnson, and Croson (2006), Goette, Huffman, and Meier (2006), 
Habyarimana et al. (2007), Kuwabara et al. (2007), Bornhorst et al. (2010) are examples of recent 
studies that use natural identities. Tajfel et al. (1971), Yamagishi and Kiyonari (2000), Simpson 
(2006), and Chen and Li (2009) are studies that induced identity in the lab using the minimal group 
paradigm, in which subjects are divided into groups based on a trivial criterion. Experiments with 
minimal groups show that such a categorization per se, no matter how trivial, is sufficient to induce 
a fairly strong group identity.  
Natural identities are multi-dimensional; many factors in addition to social identity vary with 
natural identities (Tajfel et al. 1971; Yamagishi and Kiyonari 2000; Chen and Li 2009). Moreover, 
it is generally not known beforehand how natural identities will respond to experimental 
manipulations. It is also difficult to assess whether a subject identifies with her “natural" group at 
all or if she does so whether others categorize her by her social identity Consequently, the results 
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of studies that use natural identities are more ambiguous because they can be attributed to many 
causes. Inducing identities in the lab with the minimal group paradigm, in contrast, gives the 
experimenter greater control over the subject’s prominent identity and greater confidence that 
results are due to the experimental manipulation. Based on this discussion, in the current 
experiment, social identity was induced in the lab using minimal groups. 
Subjects received five pairs of paintings by Paul Klee and Wassily Kandinsky. Depending on 
their relative preferences, half of the subjects were classified as Klees and the other half as 
Kandinskys.7 A subject’s identity as a Klee or a Kandinsky remained fixed for the rest of the 
experiment. The design included two further procedures to enhance group identity. Because these 
procedures are quite standard in the minimal group literature, they are not discussed here but given 
in full detail in the Online Appendix B.  
Once social identities were induced (or not induced, in the control condition) the primary 
experimental procedure took place. Below, we summarize the details of the mixed, choice, 
isolated, control and the no-feedback and feedback treatments. 
Mixed condition. Stage 2: In stage 2, subjects played 10 rounds of PD each time with a 
randomly matched partner. The particular outcome parameters in the PD were chosen based on 
previous experimental studies to keep cooperation levels close to .5 which would provide the 
maximum statistical power to detect differences between experimental conditions (Isaac and 
Walker 1988; Aksoy and Weesie 2013). Also, this version of the PD kept the fear and greed 
components the same (Simpson 2003; Kuwabara 2005).  
In the mixed condition, the group of the interaction partner in each of the 10 PDs was always 
alternated. In the odd-numbered (even-numbered) rounds, the interaction partner was always a 
randomly selected ingroup (outgroup) member. Participants were paid for two randomly selected 
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rounds, one ingroup and one outgroup round. Information on the rounds that were selected and 
how much subjects earned in those rounds was made available only after the subjects completed 
the experiment.8 
Stage 3: Subjects played 5 rounds of binary choice Public Goods Games (Table 1B).9 Because 
we conceptualize PG as a higher level collective good from which one cannot exclude actors of 
different social identities, in each of these five rounds two randomly selected Klees and two 
randomly selected Kandinskys were matched. Participants were paid for a randomly selected 
round. Information on the round that was selected and how much the subjects earned in this round 
was made available at the end of the experiment. 
During stages 2 and 3, no feedback about other subjects’ behavior was provided. Hence, this 
first block is called the no-feedback condition. 
Stage 4: Subjects played another 10 rounds of PD, half of the rounds with ingroup and half 
with outgroup as in stage 2. Different from stage 2, before each round the subjects received 
aggregate-level feedback about: (1)  the percentage of cooperative decisions made by Klees who 
were matched with other Klees, (2) the percentage of cooperative decisions made by Klees who 
were matched with Kandinskys, (3) the percentage of cooperative decisions made by Kandinskys 
who were matched with other Kandinskys, and (4) the percentage of cooperative decisions made 
by Kandinskys who were matched with Klees, averaged up to that round. The payment procedure 
was the same as in stage 2. 
Aggregate feedback (rather than individual feedback) was provided for the following reasons. 
If individual feedback was provided, each subject would experience a unique experimental 
history. This would undermine the experimental control over the subjects’ experiences and would 
increase unsystematic variance in the data, complicating statistical analysis. Aggregate-level 
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feedback ensured not only that each subject received the same aggregate information but also that 
each subject knew that each subject received the same information. 
Stage 5: Participants played a final 5 rounds of PG in heterogeneous groups of two Klees and 
two Kandinskys with feedback. Before each round, the subjects were informed about the 
percentage of cooperative decisions made by Klees and Kandinskys, averaged up to that round. 
Once stage 5 was completed, the randomly selected payment rounds and the amount the 
subjects earned throughout the experiment were revealed. 
Choice condition. The procedure was identical to the mixed condition with one exception. 
Instead of alternating the group of the interaction partners exogenously, in stages 2 and 4, each 
subject submitted whether she wanted to be matched with a Klee or a Kandinsky before each PD 
round. Then, the subject was matched with another subject from the target group who wanted to be 
matched with someone from the subject’s group.10  
In stage 4 in which feedback was provided the subjects were informed before partner choice 
and the PD play about the same percentages of cooperative behaviors of each group against each 
group as in the mixed condition. 
Stages 3 and 5 were exactly the same as in the mixed condition: subjects played 5 PGs in a 
heterogeneous group (two Klees two Kandinskys) formed randomly in every round, without and 
with feedback. In other words, in PGs, subjects could not choose the groups of their interaction 
partners. 
Isolated condition. The procedure was identical to the other two conditions with the following 
exception. In stages 2 and 4, where subjects played 10 PDs without and with feedback, 
respectively, the subjects were matched with people only from their own group. Stages 3 and 5 in 
this condition were exactly the same as the other two conditions. To be clear, we do not expect any 
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difference between this condition and the ingroup cooperation in the mixed condition. Different 
from the two conditions above, however, in this condition there is no (negative) contact between 
the two groups which enables us to test H3. 
Control condition. Control condition did not induce group identity. In stages 2 and 4 (3 and 5), 
subjects played 10 PDs (5 PGs) each round with randomly selected others without and with 
feedback, respectively. In stages 4 and 5, before each round, the subjects were informed about the 
overall percentage of cooperative decisions, averaged up to that round. To be clear, we do not have 
hypotheses about the control condition. This condition would reveal if the inducement of group 
identity influences cooperation in an unexpected way. 
Note that the mixed, choice, isolated, control treatments were between-subjects and the six 
stages, hence the no-feedback and feedback treatments were within subjects. The feedback 
treatment always followed the no-feedback treatment. We chose not to include a further condition 
in which the order of the no-feedback and the feedback treatments was reversed (i.e., no-feedback 
followed feedback). This was because in this alternative order, even if no-feedback was provided 
in a subsequent block, at least some subjects would remember the feedback provided in the first 
block.   
Post-Experiment Survey 
The post-experiment survey included the following four items taken from Yamagishi and Kiyonari 
(2000) to measure the degree of identification with the ingroup and outgroup: “How strongly did 
you feel belongingness to the (Klee or Kandinsky) group?" (belongingness); “How much 
commonality did you think you shared with the members of the (Klee or Kandinsky) group?" 
(commonality); “How close did you feel toward the members of the (Klee or Kandinsky) group?" 
(closeness); and “How favorably did you feel toward the members of the (Klee or Kandinsky) 
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group?" (liking). The answer categories were from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). In the control 
condition which had no grouping, these questions were omitted. 
Basic demographics (age, gender, study field, occupation, nationality), political party 
preference measured from 1 (extreme left) to 11 (extreme right), number of siblings, and level of 
experience in similar experiments were other variables measured in the post-experiment survey.11 
RESULTS 
Manipulation Check 
Participants in the minimal group condition felt more closeness (difference = 1.48, t(121) = 9.50, p 
< .05), more belongingness (difference = 1.91, t(121) = 10.59, p < .05), and commonality 
(difference = 1.34, t(121) = 7.89, p < .05) toward the ingroup and liked their ingroup significantly 
more (difference = 1.30 t(121) = 7.10, p < .05) compared to the outgroup. 12  All of these 
differences remain statistically significant when the three experimental conditions are considered 
separately. 13  Because all differences are substantial (i.e., larger than 1) and statistically 
significant, we conclude that the inducement of heterogeneity was successful. 
Cooperation 
Figure 1 displays the average cooperation in the PD and PG by treatment. Before interpreting the 
results, we should note that there is no significant main effect of a preference for the paintings of 
Klee (versus Kandinsky) on cooperation, nor is there a significant interaction of a preference for 
the paintings of Klee (versus Kandinsky) with the experimental conditions for any of the four 
panels in Figure 1. Hence, we collapse Klees’ and Kandinskys’ responses in all analyses. 
Furthermore, there is no significant effect of being a student on cooperation, and there is no 
20 
significant interaction between being a student and the experimental condition. Similarly, being a 
British citizen has no significant effect on cooperation in the PD or in PG.  
 
[Figure-1-about-here] 
 
The significance tests reported below are based on multilevel logistic regression models with 
random effects for subjects (Table 4). The subject-level random effects capture roughly the θ 
parameter in the theoretical model. When included in the model as a second level, variance across 
sessions is not statistically significant. The regression models also include the control variables 
sex, political party preference, and age, the only subject-level covariates that influence cooperation 
significantly. The effect of feedback on the effects of treatment is captured by interaction terms in 
the regression models.  
[Table-4-about-here] 
 
Note that the formal tests of our hypotheses are performed via a number of linear 
combinations of the coefficients in Table 4. Table 5 presents how these linear combinations are 
calculated, together with the associated hypotheses. Table 5 also includes the standard errors and 
the z-values of the linear combinations which are used to test the hypotheses formally.14   
 
[Table-5-about-here] 
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PD Behavior 
As apparent from Figure 1, there is a substantial difference between within-group and 
between-group cooperation in the mixed condition (H1). This is in line with theoretical 
predictions, but the effect size is striking: the odds of cooperating are approximately 4.6 times 
higher (see Table 5) with feedback and 3.2 times without feedback when ingroup members interact 
compared to the situation in which outgroup members interact.  
As predicted, when they have the choice, the majority of the subjects (more than 70 percent) 
play with an ingroup member (H2a). A separate multilevel logistic regression model with random 
effects for subjects predicting partner selection shows that the percentage of subjects who choose 
to interact with an outgroup member is significantly different from 50 percent (z = −5.04, p < .05). 
The predicted difference between within-group and between-group cooperation rates in the choice 
condition becomes statistically significant only when feedback is provided (H2b) (Δb = .63, z = 
1.86, p < .05, see Table 5). This difference is substantially significant, too: when feedback is 
provided the odds of cooperating are about 1.9 times higher in the choice condition when ingroup 
members interact compared to the situation in which outgroup members interact. 
We also find strong support for H2c: the difference between within-group and between-group 
cooperation is lower in the choice condition compared to the mixed condition (without feedback, 
difference in Δb = −1.46, z = −3.21, p < .05; with feedback, difference in Δb = −.89, z = − 2.03, p < 
.05, see Table 5). Figure 1 is useful to interpret the substantial significance of this result. Without 
feedback, within-group and between-group average cooperation rates are virtually identical in the 
choice condition but substantially different (i.e., larger than 0.2) in the mixed condition. With 
feedback, the average between-group cooperation becomes lower than the average within-group 
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cooperation in the choice condition, too. But the difference remains much higher in the mixed 
condition.  
As an aside, our results also show that when the mixed and the choice conditions are 
combined in a separate regression model, the difference between within-group and between-group 
cooperation is higher under the feedback condition than under the no-feedback condition (Δ(Δb)= 
.61, z = 2.11, p < .05). Thus, feedback moderates the negative effect of heterogeneity on 
cooperation.  
PG Behavior  
In the no-feedback condition, cooperation rates in PG across treatments are very similar. In 
fact, the differences between treatments are insignificant when subjects do not receive feedback 
about others’ decisions. When feedback is provided, the odds of cooperating in the isolated 
condition are approximately 12 times higher than in the mixed condition, and the difference is 
statistically highly significant (Δb = 2.46, z = 2.70, p < .05). The difference between the isolated 
and the choice condition is also statistically significant with feedback (Δb = 1.72, z = 1.89, p < .05). 
This corresponds to an odds ratio between the isolated and the choice condition of about 5.6. These 
results support H3. 
DISCUSSION 
In this paper we provide a micro-behavioral model and an experimental design to understand the 
effects of heterogeneity in social identities on cooperation. The theoretical scheme is a typical 
example of a micro-macro model (Coleman 1990; Hedström 2005; Raub et al.  2011). The 
micro-behavioral model links the macro constructs of heterogeneity and cooperation via the social 
preferences of actors while accounting for partner selection decisions (and thus endogenous 
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sorting). We show that given the same distribution of micro-level social preferences, depending on 
the nature of initial macro conditions quite different macro outcomes may emerge. For instance, 
the freedom actors have in choosing the social group of their interaction partners has a very 
substantial effect on the link between heterogeneity and cooperation. 
The experimental design induces heterogeneity independent of endogenous sorting and 
cooperation, thus provides a clear assessment of the causal effect of heterogeneity on cooperation. 
Moreover, the design allows us to naturally analyze cooperation at two levels, dyadic and tetradic. 
Our results show that when dyadic interactions are considered, heterogeneity decreases 
cooperation substantially. Most importantly, however, this negative relationship is moderated by 
endogenous sorting. When the subjects have the option to choose their interaction partners, a 
somewhat paradoxical effect—which is precisely predicted by our theoretical model—occurs. On 
the one hand, most of the subjects (more than 70 percent) sort and choose to interact with other 
ingroup members. On the other hand, this sorting reduces ingroup bias with respect to cooperative 
behavior. This is because when the subjects have a partner choice, then those who would act 
non-cooperatively toward outgroup others are more likely to play with ingroup others. 
Consequently, the difference between within-group and between-group cooperation is lower in the 
choice condition compared to the case in which subjects are forced to interact with outgroup 
members.   
This particular result has a number of methodological implications. Firstly, it shows that it is 
very difficult to measure heterogeneity independent of endogenous sorting in observational studies 
because in most real life situations actors have a partner choice. As a consequence, most 
observational studies might have underestimated the "true" causal effect of heterogeneity on social 
cohesion. This is because in those studies the researcher can measure heterogeneity and cohesion 
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only after participants have sorted into their environments. Conversely, most previous intergroup 
experiments might have overestimated the level of ingroup bias that occurs naturally. This is 
because in those experiments subjects typically do not have a partner choice but are forced by the 
experimenter to interact either with ingroup or outgroup members.  
Taken together, our theoretical and experimental results help us understand under which 
conditions heterogeneity is expected to reduce cooperation and social cohesion. At the local-level 
heterogeneity clearly decreases cooperation. But the size of this negative effect depends on how 
much freedom actors have in selecting their social environments. In rigid environments in which 
sorting in or out is relatively difficult, such as residential areas or schools, heterogeneity will likely 
reduce cooperation. In more fluid environments in which actors can voluntarily choose their 
interaction partners, heterogeneity is expected to influence cooperation much less, if at all. For 
example, heterogeneity in social clubs or in one's personal network should not have strong effects 
on social cohesion.  
In addition to endogenous sorting, how much heterogeneity reduces cooperation also depends 
on the history of intergroup relations and how much actors are primed about this history. Our 
experiment shows, as predicted by our theory, that information about intergroup relationships is 
another key moderator of the heterogeneity-cooperation link. Cooperation diminishes in 
heterogeneous environments quite substantially when actors are informed about a negative history 
between groups. If there is prior negative contact but the subjects are unaware of it or if there is no 
prior contact between groups, cooperation remains relatively high in heterogeneous environments. 
This also hints that the negative effect of heterogeneity on cohesion is partly a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. Our theory predicts that making intergroup conflict more salient by, for example, a 
sustained emphasis from the media or politicians will reduce social cohesion in heterogeneous 
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environments. Our results also show that the effect of information about negative contact spills 
over to more macro-level contexts. For instance, in our experiment negative contact happens 
initially in the PD context. Yet, this negative intergroup history in the PD reduces cooperation in a 
more macro level, namely in heterogeneous PG. This implies that making intergroup conflict in a 
micro-context more salient would reduce cooperation not only at the micro-context but also at 
more macro levels. 
We must add that in real life group interactions are more complex than we theoretically and 
experimentally analyzed: many other factors co-vary with social identity. For example, some 
ethnic groups are often worse-off than others and there is often a status difference between groups. 
Precisely because of these confounding factors, it is difficult to isolate the causal effect of 
heterogeneity in observational studies. We should note, however, that many of these factors will 
likely reinforce the results presented in this paper. If, for example, social identity is coupled with 
inequality, this would likely strengthen the differences between groups because actors would be 
different not only with respect to social identities but also with respect to resources. Nevertheless, 
future work should extend the experimental design presented in this paper with additional 
elements. The most obvious next step is inducing social identity and inequality together. 
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL 
Additional supporting information may be found at [insert link]. 
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NOTES 
 
1. There are a number of experimental studies which investigate cooperation in dynamic 
networks (e.g., Rand, Arbesman, and Christakis 2011; Wang, Suri, and Watts 2012; Gallo and 
Yan 2015). These studies also allow partner selection, similar to our design. In these dynamic 
network experiments, however, a subject can form a tie (or severe an existing tie) with a 
specific and anonymous individual, rather than a randomly selected member of a social 
group. Hence, these experiments do not study the effects of heterogeneity in social identity on 
endogenous sorting and cooperation. A further difference between those dynamic network 
experiments and the current design is that in those experiments a subject can be matched with 
several other subjects simultaneously. Nevertheless, the results of those dynamic network 
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experiments unequivocally show that endogenous sorting increases cooperation which is in 
line with the core argument of our paper. 
 
2. The average level of ingroup and intergroup cooperation depends on the distribution of 𝜃𝑔 , 
(i.e., they will be 1- 𝐹𝐼(
1
3
) and 1- 𝐹𝑂(
1
3
), respectively where 𝐹𝐼 and 𝐹𝑂 are the cumulative 
distributions of 𝜃𝐼  and 𝜃𝑂 ). While 𝐸(𝜃𝐼) > 𝐸(𝜃𝑂) does not ensure that 𝐹𝐼(
1
3
) < 𝐹𝑂(
1
3
), in 
most reasonable distributions ingroup cooperation will be higher than intergroup cooperation.  
3. In these examples, (𝜃𝐼 , 𝜃𝑂) is assumed to have a multivariate normal distribution with 
specific parameter values assessed as reasonable based on previous research that estimates θ 
without group manipulation (Aksoy and Weesie 2012; Aksoy and Weesie 2014). Online 
Appendix A includes a detailed description of the simulation used to produce the results in 
Table 2. 
4. Written formally what sufficiently high means, an actor i who has no partner-choice and 
plays the game with 𝑁−𝑖
𝐼  ingroup and 𝑁𝑂 outgroup others is predicted to cooperate with 
probability: Pri(Cooperation) = 𝑃𝑟(𝑁−𝑖
𝐼 𝜃𝑖
𝐼 +  𝑁𝑂𝜃𝑖
𝑂 >
1
3
). 
5. One of the 10 sessions had to be aborted prematurely due to a power failure and a subsequent 
software crash. Data recorded before the power failure were used in the analyses whenever 
possible. Removing or including this session from the analyses does not change the results. 
6. All instructions and the screens subjects saw during the experiment are available from the 
authors upon request.  
7. Splitting the session into to equally sized groups maximizes the Herfindahl index, a standard 
measure of heterogeneity. 
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8. After the PDs and PGs, beliefs about others' behavior were measured using the quadratic 
discount rule which is a “proper" scoring rule (i.e., truth telling is a dominant strategy) 
(Palfrey and Wang 2009). In this paper, we do not discuss beliefs. 
9. The particular outcomes of PG and the PD in Table 1 kept the "Marginal Per Capita Return" 
the same between the PD and PG, viz., .75. 
10. In some cases, the number of people in a focal group who wanted to be matched with a 
target group could be different than the number of people in the target group who wanted to be 
matched with the focal group. In such cases, the computer performed a one-to-many 
matching. If there was nobody in the target group, the computer randomly selected a decision 
from previous rounds from the target group that wanted to match with the focal group. If there 
was no one in any of the previous rounds, the computer randomly selected a decision. 
Subjects were fully informed about this matching procedure. 
11. Generalized trust was also measured in the post-experiment survey. We do not discuss the 
results on trust in detail for brevity. The levels of trust across the four experimental conditions 
are almost a copy of the levels of cooperation in PG with feedback. That is, trust in the mixed 
condition is significantly lower than trust in all other three conditions. This is inline with past 
research which shows a deep connection between cooperation and trust (Kuwabara et al. 
2014; Irwin, Mulder, and Simpson 2014). 
12. We report one-tailed p-values when we test explicit hypotheses (e.g., Table 5). All other 
p-values (manipulation checks and those in Table 4) are two-tailed. 
13. See Table C1 in the online appendix for the means, the standard deviations, and the standard 
errors of the means of these items calculated separately for the ingroup and the outgroup. 
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14. The standard errors of the linear combinations are calculated using the Stata command 
"lincom". 
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TABLES 
Table 1 A: The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD); B: Public Goods Game (PG). The numbers in cells 
indicate outcomes. In PG, the first number in a cell indicates how much Player 1 earns and the 
remaining numbers indicate how much others earn where the right-hand side number(s) indicate 
the outcome(s) for non-cooperator(s).  
(A) Prisoner’s Dilemma     
 Player 2 cooperates Player 2 does not cooperate 
 Player 1 gets Player 2 gets Player 1 gets Player 2 gets 
Player 1 cooperates 30 30 15 35 
Player 1 does not cooperate 35 15 20 20 
     
(B) Public Goods Game     
 Number of other players who cooperate 
 3 2 1 0 
Player 1 cooperates 60, 60, 60, 60 45, 45, 45, 65 30, 30, 50, 50 15, 35, 35, 35 
Player 1 does not cooperate 65, 45, 45, 45 50, 30, 30, 50 35, 15, 35, 35 20, 20, 20, 20 
 
  
39 
Table 2: Predictions for overall, within-group, and between-group cooperation rates: Some 
examples.* Overall cooperation rate in the no-choice case is calculated assuming 50% of 
interactions take place within and 50% between groups (i.e., random matching).  
  With Partner Choice Without Partner Choice 
  % Cooperation % Intergroup 
contact 
% Cooperation 
Mean(𝜃𝐼) Mean(𝜃𝑂) Overall Within Between  Overall Within Between 
.3 −.1 48 49 38 8 26 46 7 
.3 .0 50 51 43 15 29 46 13 
.3 .1 54 55 50 25 34 46 22 
.3 .2 59 60 58 37 39 46 33 
 .2 −.2 34 35 24 8 18 33 4 
.2 −.1 36 37 29 15 20 33 7 
.2 .0 39 41 35 25 23 33 13 
.2 .1 44 45 42 37 27 33 22 
*(𝜃𝐼 , 𝜃𝑂) is normally distributed with SD(𝜃𝐼) = SD(𝜃𝑂) = .3 and Corr(𝜃𝐼 , 𝜃𝑂) = .3. 
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Table 3: Experimental design. Columns are between-subjects rows are within-subjects treatments. 
PD=Prisoner’s Dilemma, PG=Public Goods Game.  
Stage  Mixed Choice Isolated  Control 
1  Inducing group identity  No group identity 
     
2 
N
o
-f
ee
d
b
ac
k
 10 PDs 10 PDs 10 PDs  10 PDs 
 5 PDs with ingroup  
5 PDs with outgroup 
Partner's group based 
on choice  
All PDs with 
ingroup 
  
      
3 5 Mixed PGs 5 Mixed PGs 5 Mixed PGs  5 PGs 
      
4 
A
g
g
re
g
at
e 
fe
ed
b
ac
k
 
10 PDs 10 PDs 10 PDs  10 PDs 
 5 PD with ingroup  
5 PD with outgroup 
Partner's group based 
on choice 
All PDs with 
ingroup 
  
      
5 5 Mixed PGs 5 Mixed PGs 5 Mixed PGs  5 PGs 
      
6  Post-experiment survey 
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Table 4: Multilevel logistic regression models with random intercepts for subjects predicting 
cooperative behavior (1=Cooperate, 0=Defect) in the PD and PG. 
 PD PG 
Treatment Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
Control (reference)     
Isolated  −.73 (.76) 1.27 (.91) 
Choice    −.45 (.87) 
  Choice ingroup −.76 (.74)   
  Choice outgroup −1.39 (.77)   
Mixed    −1.19 (.86) 
  Mixed ingroup  −.65 (.74)   
  Mixed outgroup −2.17* (.74)   
NoFeedback (NF) −1.39* (.26) .17 (.42) 
Isolated × NF .36 (.30) −1.47* (.52) 
Choice × NF   −1.27* (.48) 
  Choice_ingr × NF −.18 (.33)   
  Choice_ougr × NF .75 (.44)   
Mixed × NF   −.14 (.45) 
  Mixed_ingr × NF .36 (.33)   
  Mixed_ougr × NF .73* (.35)   
Constant  1.84 (.94) 3.24* (1.13) 
Control variables     
Period −.28* (.03) −.49* (.09) 
Period×NF .15* (.04) .32* (.12) 
Female  .86 (.51) 1.34* (.60) 
Right-wing −.22* (.11) −.46* (.13) 
Age  .04* (.02) .035 (.02) 
Random     
Ln(sig_u^2) 2.26* (.17) 2.56* (.20) 
N(decision) 3240 1620 
N(Subject) 162 162 
Log-likelihood −1400.60 −636.33 
 * p < .05 for two-tailed tests. 
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Table 5: Tests of hypotheses as linear combinations (LC) of coefficients in Table 4.  
Predicted 
contrast  
LC of coefficients in 
Table 4 to be tested 
Calculation of 
LC  
(S.E.) 
and [z] 
of LC  
Odds 
ratio: 
exp(LC) 
Predict
ed sign 
of LC 
PD      
Mixed ingr. vs. 
mixed ougr. 
(Feedback)  
mixed ingr. − mixed 
ougr. =: A 
−.65 − −2.17 = 
1.53* 
(.28)  
[5.41] 
4.61 + (H1) 
      
Mixed ingr. vs. 
mixed ougr.  
(No Feedback) 
(mixed ingr + 
mixed_ingr × NF)  − 
(mixed ougr + 
mixed_ougr × NF) =: B 
(−.65 + .36) − 
(−2.17 + .73) = 
1.16* 
(.27)     
[4.24] 
3.18 + (H1) 
      
Choice ingr. vs. 
Choice ougr. 
(Feedback) 
choice ingr. − choice 
ougr. =: C 
−.76 − −1.39 = 
.63* 
(.34)     
[1.86] 
1.88 + (H2b) 
      
Choice ingr. vs. 
Choice ougr.  
(No Feedback) 
(choice ingr + 
choice_ingr × NF)  − 
(choice ougr + 
choice_ougr× NF) =: D 
(−.76 + −.18) − 
(−1.39 + .75) = 
−.30 
(.36) 
[-.83] 
.74 + (H2b) 
      
(Choice ingr. − 
Choice ougr.) vs. 
(Mixed ingr. − 
mixed ougr.) 
(Feedback) 
C − A  .63 − 1.53  =  
−.89* 
(.44)     
[− 2.03] 
.41 − (H2c) 
      
(Mixed ingr. − 
mixed ougr.) vs. 
(Choice ingr. − 
Choice ougr.) 
(No Feedback) 
 D − B −.30 − 1.16 = 
−1.46* 
 
(.46)   
[−3.21] 
.23 − (H2c) 
PG      
Isolated vs. 
Mixed 
(Feedback) 
Isolated − Mixed 1.27− −1.19 = 
2.46* 
(.91)    
[2.70] 
11.70 + (H3) 
      
Isolated vs. 
Choice 
(Feedback) 
Isolated − Choice 1.27 − −.45 = 
1.72* 
(.91) 
[1.89] 
5.58 + (H3) 
      
Choice vs. Mixed 
(Feedback) 
Choice − Mixed −.45 − −1.19 = 
.74 
(.84)     
[.88] 
2.10 + (H3) 
* p < .05 for one-tailed tests. 
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Average cooperation by treatment. The error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals 
obtained using robust standard errors. In the choice condition the average percentage of subjects 
who choose to play with an ingroup vs. an outgroup member is also indicted. 
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